Editorial comment
Tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormiz has collapsed since mid February, and pressure on oil and gas markets continues to mount. In peacetime, 20% of the world’s oil and gas is shipped from producers in the Gulf through the Strait, including 20 million bpd of oil. Over some time periods in the past two months, we have seen effectively zero ships transiting the strait, and hopes for a meaningful, long-term cessation of hostilities are increasingly in jeopardy.
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London-based Shipbroker, Clarksons, recently spoke to Reuters about the prospects for a ceasefire: “Recent weeks have brought several false starts and, although some form of resolution is likely at some point, the timing of any durable breakthrough remains highly uncertain”.1
Even when partially open, traffic is down about 90%, and highly erratic. A weekend escalation in mid April saw Iran firing what appeared to be warning shots at vessels, and the US military seizing an Iranian cargo ship. A total of three ships passed through the Straits in a 12 hour period (compared to about 130 per day in normal circumstances). Ships continue to cluster outside the corridor, and operators are weighing war risk as much as commercial logic.
A renewed interest in pipeline alternatives is not surprising amid this landscape. Saudi Arabia is currently pumping as much crude as it can through its pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The East-West pipeline (also known as Petroline) was built in the early 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq War threatened shipping in the Persian Gulf. It now has new importance in the world economy: Aramco is transporting 7 million bpd of oil through the 746 mile pipeline, which offers a direct route to global markets without passing through Hormuz.
The UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah pipeline (also called the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline or ADCOP) is performing a similar function, moving approximately 1.7 million bpd to the Gulf of Oman port of Fujairah, which sits beyond the Strait.
Another option is the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (also known as the Iraq-Türkiye Crude Oil Pipeline), which connects northern Iraq to the Mediterranean coast at Ceyhan, with a nominal capacity of around 1.6 million bpd, although in practice, flows have been far lower. Operations have been repeatedly disrupted, and recent reports suggest intermittent throughput amid ongoing repair efforts and political negotiations.
These systems were not designed for this exact moment, but they are stepping in to help save the day. However, even at full utilisation, existing bypass pipelines cannot compensate for the scale of disruption currently being seen in the Strait. Nor can they fully replicate the flexibility of maritime transport, which allows cargoes to be rerouted, delayed, or redirected in response to shifting market signals.
The East-West pipeline was conceived in response to a different conflict, in a different era, but is serving today’s geo-political circumstances, albeit amid recent threats from the Houthis to target Red Sea assets. Land-based pipelines are, of course, just as vulnerable to attack as ships sailing through a strait (arguably more so, since they are static assets). This fact will not stop Middle Eastern countries from pursuing new pipeline infrastructure in the wake of 2026’s Hormuz turmoil. Türkiye, in particular, is positioning itself as a strategic alternative corridor between the Gulf and European markets, with renewed discussion around pipelines that could bypass Hormuz entirely and redraw regional energy flows. At the same time, analysts suggest that the current disruption will accelerate investment in additional Middle Eastern export pipelines, from expanded Red Sea capacity to new links across Iraq and beyond.
